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ARTICLES

ROGELIO L6PEZ-VELARDE*

Mexico's New Petroleum Law:
The Internal Reforms at Pemex
and the North American Free
Trade Agreement**
Mexico has adopted new federal legislation for the restructuring and moderniza-

tion of its oil, gas, and petrochemical industry. Additionally, Mexico has negotiated a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada. With both thcse
initiatives Mexico will consolidate a new petroleum law.
This article first discusses Mexico's constitutional basis regarding the ownership of domestic hydrocarbons. Next follows an analysis of Petr6cleos Mexicanos'
(Pemex) juridical framework, Mexico's petroleum law, and other relevant federal
statutes, highlighting issues related to service contracts and risk contracts. Fur-

ther, this article comments briefly on the modernization program in the Mexican
oil, gas, and petrochemical sector and the recent reforms adopted by Congress
that have restructured Pemex and created four new entities. Finally, the article
addresses the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
*Attorney and Counsellor-at-law admitted to the bar in Mexico in 1988 and in New York in 1991.
J.D., Universidad Iberoamericana Law School, magna cum laude; LL.M., University of Houston
Law Center. Professor of Private International Law at Universidad Iberoamericana Law School.
Professor of Judicial Process to the Mexican Legal Studies Program of the University of Houston Law
Center. Part of this article has been used by the author in a number of conferences delivered in the
United States and Mexico.
**This article was current as of the date of submission on September 30, 1993. As part of the
implementation process of the NAFTA, several federal statutes quoted herein will be amended, derogated,
or abrogated as of January 1, 1994. The Editorial Reviewer for the article was James H. DeMent, Jr.

2

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

I. Constitutional Basis
Under the Mexican Constitution the ownership of petroleum and all solid,
liquid, and gaseous hydrocarbons is vested in the state.' The ownership of such
natural resources is a constitutional right that is imprescriptible and not subject
to alienation.2 Accordingly, any type of concession or contract for the exploitation
of Mexico's domestic hydrocarbons is strictly proscribed.3
In 1958, Mexico's federal Congress enacted a law aimed at regulating and
implementing this constitutional mandate in the petroleum sector. 4 Congress construed article 27 of the Constitution by broadly defining what the "petroleum
industry" legally means. 5 The petroleum industry encompasses, inter alia, the
exploration, exploitation, refining, transportation, storage, distribution, and
first-hand sale of petroleum, natural gas, byproducts obtained from them, and
basic petrochemicals 6 Thus, all the phases of the oil and gas business in Mexico
have been exclusively reserved to the Mexican Government. The legal entity
entrusted by the federal Congress to conduct and control economic activity in
this industry is Pemex, 7 along with the recently created organismos subsidiarios
(subsidiaries). 8 By operation of law and for the benefit of the Mexican nation,
1. See MEx. CONST. art. 27, para. 4.
2. Id. art. 27, para. 6; see also Ley Reglamentaria del Artfculo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo
del Petr6leo [Regulatory Law to Article 27 of the Constitution on the Petroleum Branch], DIARIO
OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACi6N [D.O.] (Nov. 29, 1958), amended by D.O. (Dec. 30, 1977) art. 1
[hereinafter Petroleum Law]. See generally Alejandro Ortega San Vicente, Marco Jurtdico-Polftico
del Petrdleo en Mixico, PEMEx LEx L.J., July-Aug. 1992, at 50; Enrique SAnchez Bringas, El
Rfgimen Jurldico del Petr6leo en Mixico, 12 JURIDICA 769 (1980).
3. See MEx. CONST. art. 27, para. 6. The prohibition of granting concessions or contracts for
the exploitation of Mexico's petroleum resources was added to article 27 of the Constitution in 1960.
See Ortega San Vicente, supra note 2, at 53.
4. Petroleum Law, supra note 2.
5. The Petroleum Law of 1958 made a broader interpretation of the term "oil industry," by
including further areas and phases of the oil and gas business in Mexico that were not originally
envisioned in the previous implementing statutes of 1940 and 1941. See Ley Reglamentaria del
Artfculo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo [Regulatory Law to Article 27 of the Constitution
on the Petroleum Branch], D.O. (Nov. 9, 1940) art. 3, repealed by D.O. (June 18, 1941) art. 5,
repealed by Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 5. On this issue, see Ortega San Vicente, supra note
2, at 50-52, Regarding the risk contracts restriction embodied in the 1958 Petroleum Law, see infra
text accompanying notes 49-70.
6. See Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 3, § I; see also Reglamento de la Lay Reglamentaria del
Artfculo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo [Enabling Law for the Regulatory Law to Article 27
of the Constitution on the Petroleum Branch], D.O. (Aug. 25, 1959) art. 3, § I [hereinafter Enabling
Petroleum Law]; Ley Organica de Petr6leos Mexicanos y Organismos Subsidiarios [Organic Law of
Petr6leos Mexicanos and Subsidiary Entities], D.O. (July 16, 1992) arts. 2,3 [hereinafter Pemex Charter].
7. See Decreto que Crea la Instituci6n Petr6leos Mexicanos [Decree that Creates the Institution
Petr6leos Mexicanos], D.O. (June 7, 1938) art. 3 [hereinafter Pemex Decree]; Petroleum Law, supra
note 2, art. 4; Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 2.
8. Effective on July 17, 1992, Congress repealed the former Ley Orghnica de Petr6leos Mexican6s [Organic Law of Petr6leos Mexicanos], D.O. (Feb. 6, 1971), and passed a new federal legislation that created four new decentralized public entities (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
subsidiaries). See Pemex Charter, supra note 6. Concerning the nature of the subsidiaries, see infra
text accompanying notes 95-137.
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Pemex is in charge of a vertically integrated monopoly in the oil and natural gas
industry.
All domestic hydrocarbon resources (whether solid, liquid, or in gas form) and
basic petrochemicals9 are deemed to be "strategic activities." 10 Under Mexican
law strategic activities are those economic activities of paramount importance to
the nation and constitutionally reserved to the state. 1 The Mexican state develops
these strategic activities through decentralized public entities. 2 Private participa-

tion, either national or foreign, is clearly prohibited.' 3 However, Mexican law
permits indirect participation, or portfolio investment.14 Congress regulates these
strategic activities by imposing a vertical state monopoly on Mexico's petroleum
industry and exclusively reserving to the state the right to the strategic activities. 3
H. Pemex's Legal Status
Mexico's petroleum and natural gas law may be established by analyzing ex-

isting Mexican law and the legal framework of Pemex and its subsidiaries.16
Pemex was chartered by an act of the Mexican federal Congress in 1938,'" follow9. Basic petrochemicals are those chemicals derived from oil and natural gas that are considered
strategic in Mexico. These basic petrochemicals result from the first physical or chemical transformation of crude oil and natural gas. Pemex's sectoral head, the Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Parastatal
Industry, decides which petrochemicals shall be considered as basic petrochemicals and, therefore,
which petrochemicals are exclusively reserved to the state. Such determination is usually made upon
the issuance of an opinion rendered by the Mexican Petrochemical Commission, which is a technical
consulting agency of the federal government of Mexico. See Reglamento de la Ley Reglamentaria
del Articulo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo, en Materia de Petroquimica [Enabling Law
for the Regulatory Law to Article 27 of the Constitution on the Petroleum Branch, in the Petrochemical
Area], D.O. (Feb. 9, 1971).
10. See MEX. CONST. art. 25 & art. 28, para. 4; see also Ley Federal de Entidades Paraestatales
[Federal Law on Parastatal Entities], D.O. (May 14, 1986) arts. 6, 14 [hereinafter Parastatal Law].
11. See MEx. CONST. art. 25 & art. 28, para. 4.
12. See Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 14, § I; Reglamento de la Ley Federal de las Entidades
Paraestatales [Regulations to the Federal Law on Parastatal Entities], D.O. (Jan. 26, 1990) [hereinafter
Regulations to the Parastatal Law].
13. See MEx. CONST. art. 28, para. 4; Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular
la Inversi6n Extranjera [Law to Promote Mexican Investment and for the Regulation of Foreign
Investment], D.O. (Nov. 9, 1973) art. 5 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Law].
14. See Ley General de Deuda Pdblica [General Law on Public Debt], D.O. (Dec. 31, 1976)
[hereinafter Public Debt Law].
15. As provided in Mexico's Constitution, all types of monopolistic practices, restraints of trade,
and antitrust behavior are legally barred and punishable under Mexican law. The strategic areas listed
in MEX. CONST. art. 28, para. 4 do not, however, constitute a forbidden monopoly. See also Foreign
Investment Law, supra note 13, art. 4. Other economic activities that the government exclusively
retains within Mexico's energy sector include basic petrochemicals, radioactive minerals and the
generation of nuclear energy, specific mining resources, and electricity.
16. Paradoxically, notwithstanding that Mexico is a country rich in natural resources, that the
oil industry is a very important economic activity, and that the history of oil virtually mirrors the
modern history of Mexico, no law school in Mexico teaches a course in Petroleum Law or Oil and
Gas, as many countries do. An exception is the Universidad Iberoamericana Law School, where
"Energy Law" is taught every other semester as an elective.
17. Pemex Decree, supra note 7.
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ing the nationalization and expropriation of Mexico's oil industry some months
before. '
Under Mexican law the President is in charge of the federal public administration which, in turn, is divided into two distinguishable sectors: centralized and

parastatal. 9 Pemex and its subsidiaries are considered parastatals,20 since the law
regards them as decentralized public entities. 2'

A.

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS

The activities of Pemex and its subsidiaries are subject to many regulations and

statutes. First, Mexico's federal jurisdiction exclusively controls the oil industry.22 However, private law governs many acts of Pemex and its subsidiaries.23
Nonetheless, Pemex and its subsidiaries' petroleum and gas operations are concurrently or exclusively regulated by public policy provisions.24
Although Pemex and its subsidiaries have a separate legal existence and technically are independent from the federal government,25 they still remain tied to the

18. For Mexico, what hadoccurred was a great symbolic andpassionate act of resistance to foreign control, which

would be central to thespirit of nationalism that tied the country together. To thecompanies, theexpropriation
wasabsolutely illegitimate, a violation of clear agreements andformal commitments, adenial of what they had
created by risking their capital andenergies.

The 1938nationalization wasseenasoneof thegreatest triumphs of therevolution. Mexico was the complete
master of its oil industry, andPetrdleos Mexicanos-Pemex-would emerge asoneof the first andmost important
state-owned oil companies in the world. Mexico had,indeed, established a model for thefuture.
DANIEL YEROIN, THE PRIzE, THE Epic QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 276, 279 (1991); see

also Decreto Expropriatorio [Expropiation Decree], D.O. (Mar. 19, 1938).
19. See MEX. CONST. art. 90.

20. Pemex and its subsidiaries have been endowed with their own legal personality and patrimony.
Each validly exists as an independent legal entity and is fully qualified and empowered to own assets
and carry on business activities in each jurisdiction of Mexico. All decentralized entities such as
Pemex, public enterprises, trust funds, and other forms of legal entities in which the federal government or other public instrumentality owns a majority interest, or has a reserved right to exclusively
subscribe a specific class of stock, or where the federal government has the power to control the
administration of the juridical entity, fall within the category of parastatal entities. See Ley Orgdnica
de la Administraci6n Pdiblica Federal [Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration], D.O.
(Dec. 29, 1976) arts. 45 et seq. [hereinafter Organic Law]. See also Parastatal Law, supra note 10,
art. 2.
21. Organic Law, supra note 20, art. 45; see also Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 4; Pemex
Charter, supra note 6, art. 1; Parastatal Law, supra note 10, arts. 14-27.
22. The Mexican Constitution has reserved to the federal Congress the power to legislate throughout the Mexican territory on hydrocarbons. See MEx. CONST. art. 73, pt. X; see also Petroleum Law,
supra note 2, art. 9.
23. The activities performed by Pemex and its subsidiaries within the oil industry are considered
commercial activities. See Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 12; C6digo de Comercio [Commerce
Code] art. 75, § IV. Pemex and its subsidiaries are deemed to be decentralized public agencies of
the federal government of the United Mexican States, of technical, industrial, and commercial nature.
See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 3.
24. Ordenpilblicoprovisions are those statutory regulations where party autonomy is very limited,
foreign law cannot apply, and above all, obligatory compliance is required. Almost all of the statutes
quoted herein contain public policy dispositions.
25. See, e.g., Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 11.
VOL. 28, NO. 1
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central government. For instance, Pemex and its subsidiaries' budget and planning
are governed by federal regulators. 26 Each fiscal year the budget of Pemex and
its subsidiaries must be prepared by the federal government, approved by Congress, and published in the official gazette in order to be legally binding. 27 Congress annually authorizes the Federal Revenue Law, which provides the debt
ceilings that parastatals must observe for the coming fiscal year. The financial
programs of Pemex and its subsidiaries are supervised by the Ministry of Finance
and Public Credit, and any credit requests must be approved and registered before
that Ministry. 28 Therefore, Pemex's capital expenditure and investment programs
depend on the central government, specifically the Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit. That ministry also consolidates and elaborates Pemex's budget and puts
it before Congress to be voted on. 29 A technical body of the chamber of deputies
called Contaduria Major de Hacienda annually reviews and approves the consolidated financial statements and balance sheets of Pemex and its subsidiaries., °

Under the new Pemex Charter, Pemex is responsible for the annual accounting
and financial consolidation of all entities owned or controlled by Pemex, including
its subsidiaries. 31 Thus, the achievement of their sectoral plans and institutional
programs and the compliance of their budgets is subject to the general review,
assessment, and approval of Congress.32 The disposal of funds and Pemex's
capital expenditures are also subject to surveillance by the Comptroller's Office
26. Mexico has a National Development Plan that has to be promulgated within the first six
months after the new President has assumed control of the executive branch. This plan not only
enumerates the economic policies to be taken care of by the ongoing administration, but also indicates
the sectoral and regional programs in which the parastatals-like Pemex and its subsidiaries-have
a pronounced participation, along with the corresponding institutional programs directly assigned to
those parastatal entities. Currently, Pemex and the subsidiaries are globally managed by the National
Energy Modernization Plan. See Ley de Planeaci6n [Planning Law], D.O. (Jan. 5, 1983). Regarding
Pemex and the subsidiaries' compliance to such sectoral and institutional programs, see Parastatal
Law, supra note 10, arts. 46 et seq.
27. The Regulatory Law [Pemex's Decree] passed pursuant to the Mexican Constitution specifically creates a national
oil company, Pemex, to implement the National Development Plan for hydrocarbon resources. Pemex is not
privately owned and is governed by a council (Consejo de Administracidn) composed of Presidential appointees.
Decisions made by the governing council are made in furtherance of Mexican National policy concerning its
Petroleum resources.
. Mexican law, however, mandates that Pensx gather information concerning these resources and create
programs to implement the six-year [Nlational [D]evelopment [Plian devised by the various government ministries
and adopted by the President of Mexico.

In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 565-66 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
28. See Public Debt Law, supra note 14, arts. 2 et seq.
29. See Ley de Presupuesto, Contabilidad y Gasto Ptblico [Law of Budgeting, Accounting and
Public Expenditure], D.O. (Dec. 31, 1976); Reglamento de la Ley de Presupuesto, Contabilidad y
Gasto Publico [Regulatory Law of Budgeting, Accounting and Public Expenditure], D.O. (Nov. 18,
1981).
30. Law of Budgeting, Accounting and Public Expenditure, supra note 29, art. 2; see Ley
Orginica de la Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda [Organic Law of the Treasury Accounting Office],
D.O. (Dec. 28, 1978).
31. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 5.
32. See generally TRINIDAD LANZ, LA CONTRALORIA Y EL CONTROL INTERNO EN MIxico 527
(1987).
SPRING 1994
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of the federal government.13 Similarly, specific fiduciary duties with strict stan-

dards of care and loyalty govern the incumbent officials of Pemex, its subsidiaries,
and many of their employees.'
As one might imagine, Pemex and its subsidiaries are also subject to a special
fiscal regime; they do not pay dividends or income taxes, but they do pay a
substantial sum of their total revenues to the treasury by means of exploitation
"duties.- 3 5 Traditionally, the government based the tax regime placed upon
Pemex upon the gross revenues received from the sale of crude oil, natural gas,
and byproducts. However, because of the need to fortify autonomy and encourage

modernization of its operations, income tax regulation and other statutory schemes
were realized. 36 As of 1993 the government modified Pemex's special tax regime
in order to establish a more stable fiscal scheme. In addition to paying contributions prescribed under Mexican tax law, except regular income taxes, the law

requires Pemex to pay oil extraction duties, both ordinary and extraordinary, tax
on oil income, and duties on hydrocarbons. 37

Labor relations of Pemex and its subsidiaries are also subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of Mexico's federal authorities. 38 Every two years Pemex negotiates
and signs a collective bargaining agreement with the Petroleum Workers Union

of the Mexican Republic. This collective bargaining agreement encompasses the
entire petroleum, gas, and basic petrochemical industry, which Pemex controls. 39
Moreover, a federal statute specifically protects and regulates a significant bulk
33. Article 134 of the Mexican Constitution reads:
The economic resources available to the Federal Government andthe Government of the Federal District, as well
astheir respective Parastata Administrations, shall be administered with efficiency, efficacy andhonesty to satisfy
the objectives that they are bound for . .. [p]ublic officials shall be responsible for the compliance of these
dispositions as provided inchapter IV of this Constitution.

34. See Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Pdblicos [Federal Public Servants
Responsibilities Law], D.O. (Dec. 31, 1982).
35. Mexico's federal Congress is empowered to levy taxes "[o]n the utilization and exploitation
of the natural resources embodied in paragraphs 4th and 5th of Article 27." MEX. CoNsT. art. 73,
pt. XXIX(2); see Ley del Impuesto Especial sobre Producci6n y Servicios [Special Tax Law on
Production and Services], D.O. (Dec. 30, 1980).
36. See, e.g., Baraquiel Ipez, Pemex Will Negotiate New Fiscal Conditionsto Boost Modernization,
EL FINANCIERO INT'L, July 20, 1992, at 26; John Saxe-Ferndndez, Petrdleos Mexicanos, a 55
Afios de su Expropiacitn, ExcgLSIOR, Mar. 12, 1993, I-1.
37. See Ley de Ingresos de laFederaci6n para el Ejercicio Fiscal de 1993 [Federal Revenue Law
for the Fiscal Year of 1993], D.O. (Jan. 1, 1993) art. 4; see also Regimen Fiscal de Pemex y sus
Organismos Subsidiarios, 1993, PETROFINANZAS, Oct.-Dec. 1992, at 11. The author foresees that
for 1994 the tax regime for Pemex and its subsidiaries will be reformed. The current taxes and duties
will be allocated among the subsidiaries in accordance with the line of business assigned to them.
Tantamount to an income tax, each subsidiary will pay a tax on gross revenues and also withhold and
deliver the value added tax. See Nuevo Rigimen Fiscalpara Penex a Partirde 1994; JnformardSobre
Impuestos Generados, EL FINANCIERO, July 14, 1993, at 8.
38. See MEx. CONST. art. 123, § A, pts. XXXI(a)8 & 9, (b) 1;see also Ley Federal del Trabajo
[Federal Labor Law].
39. The director general of Pemex has been exclusively empowered for the negotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement with the union, and is also entitled to issue the Reglamento de Trabajo
del Personal de Confianza [Work Regulations Governing the Confidential Personnel]. See Pemex
Charter, supra note 6, art. 13, § III.
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of the properties and assets of Pemex and its subsidiaries.40 The patrimony owned
by Pemex and its subsidiaries is imprescriptible, subject to many legal constraints,
including immunity from attachment, attachment in aid of execution, or execution
from an adjudicatory contest, 4' and special choice of law and forum regulations. 2

Likewise, dispute resolution with Pemex43 has become increasingly complex
domestically and overseas" by virtue of the fact that Pemex interacts as an instrument of the state's sovereignty and also as a commercial player.
40. See Ley General de Bienes Nacionales [General Law on National Patrimony], D.O. (Jan. 8,
1982).
41. See, e.g., id. arts. 2, 3, 4, 16, 35, 60; see also C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles
[Federal Code of Civil Procedure]. See also the immunity granted under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to certain property owned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 28 U. S.C.
§ 1609 (1976). But see the exceptions established in id. § 1610.
42. See General Law on National Patrimony, supra note 40, art. 7.
43. "Federal law shall be applied to all acts, agreements and contracts in which Petr6leos Mexicanos is involved, and disputes in which it is a party, of whatever nature, will belong to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts." Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 14. In the author's view, this
provision does not purport to have an extraterritorial reach. Thus, Pemex's specially tailored choice
of law and forum rules should only apply domestically. Furthermore, the author does not construe
the term "exclusive jurisdiction" as the principle of law commonly used and referred to in private
international law. For further analysis on the matter, see Fernando A. Vdzquez Pando, Mexican Law
of JudicialCompetence, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 337, 356-57 (1990); Fernando A. Vdzquez Pando, The
Mexican Debt Crisisin Perspective:Faulty Legal Structuresand Aftershocks, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 171
(1988); Fernando A. Vdzquez Pando, Consideraciones Jurfdicas sobre la Teoria y la Prictica de la
Inversi6n Extranjera Indirecta en Mdxico, a travds de Financiamientos, Address Before the First
Seminar on Private International Law at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) (Oct.
1977), in PRIMER SEMINA~io NACIONAL DE DERCliO INTERNACIONAL PRIvADo 25, 45-49 (UNAM
1979). On the other hand, article 14 of the Pemex Charter was recently unsuccessfully challenged
before the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue before the court was whether article 14
should be interpreted as an implied waiver of the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
If adopted,Arriba's imaginative "sue andbe sued" theory of implied waiver would presumably deny Pemex
aovereign immunity in most if not all future actions to which it is a party. We decline to adopt thetheory.
... Consequently, Pemex's enabling legislation, without more, is hardly a waiver of its sovereign immunity
within themeaningof theFSIA.

Arriba, Ltd. v. Petr6leos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1992) (footnotes omitted).
44. At least before U.S. courts, Pemex has had great success in litigating and having its controversies dismissed. Based upon the act of state doctrine, sovereign immunity, and the forum non conveniens
doctrine, Pemex has been able to obtain the dismissal of many cases without judicial review of the
merits. A considerable number of landmark precedents have been rendered on the matter by several
U.S. federal courts of appeals and even by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Tubular Inspectors,
Inc. v. Petr6leos Mexicanos, 977 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1992); Arriba, Ltd. v. Petr6leos Mexicanos,
962 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1992); Stena Rederi AB v. Comisi6n de Contratos del Comit6 Ejecutivo
General del Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Reptiblica Mexicana, S.C.,
923 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1991); Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1987);
D'Angelo v. Petr6leos Mexicanos, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); In
re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982); see also Rogelio L6pez-Velarde, Apuntes Acerca
de una Posible Moratoria desde el Puntode Vista del Derecho InternacionalPrivado y del Derecho
PositivoEstadounidense,ImIELFORO [Max. B. Ass'N L.J.] No. 2 (1990). Nevertheless, lately Pemex
is trying to isolate itself from the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. federal courts because litigation in the
United States has become extremely expensive, lengthy, unreliable, and uncertain in many instances.
Additionally, U.S. liberal pretrial discovery has become intrusive, unfair, costly, and above all, too
burdensome for a foreign enterprise like Pemex. Pemex is currently resorting to other means of dispute
SPRING 1994
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In spite of the fact that Pemex and its subsidiaries are amenable to exclusively
conduct and develop the petroleum industry,45 Pemex and its subsidiaries remain

capable and empowered to enter into a vast variety of contracts and transactions
including service and public works contracts, which are generally governed by
the Mexican Constitution and implemented by federal statutes.47 These statutes

were envisioned for the procurement of goods by the government and its parastatals (such as Pemex and its subsidiaries) and the rendering of services and works

for the benefit of these parastatals. 45
B.

SERVICE CONTRACTS

In order to comply with the above-mentioned constitutional mandate, federal
legislation has imposed legal constraints that directly and indirectly regulate service and public works contracts. Those restraints require that:
(i) The petroleum industry must be exclusively conducted and 49
controlled by
Pemex with the assistance and support of its subsidiaries;
(ii) The first-hand sale of domestic hydrocarbons and retailing of petroleum

resolution in the international arena in order to avoid the extraterritorial arm of U.S. jurisdiction.
These mechanisms include settling complaints by means of arbitration, mediation, and litigation in
Mexican forums or another convenient jurisdiction.
45. Pemex, along with its subsidiaries, remains the only juridical persons legally empowered,
with authority granted by Congress, to exclusively conduct and control the oil industry on behalf of
the state. Nevertheless, Congress may lawfully authorize other public instrumentalities or agencies
to participate in such a strategic activity. See Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 4; Parastatal Law,
supra note 10, art. 14, § I; Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 3.
46. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 4; Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 6.
47. See MEx CONST. art. 134; Ley de Obras PIblicas [Public Works Law], D.O. (Dec. 30, 1980),
amendedby D.O. (July 18, 1991); Reglamento de la Ley de Obras Pdblicas [Regulations to the Public
Works Law], D.O. (Feb. 13, 1985), amended by D.O. (July 18, 1991); Ley de Adquisiciones,
Arrendamientos y Prestaci6n de Servicios Relacionados con Bienes Muebles [Law for Acquisitions,
Leases and Rendering of Services Related to Movable Goods], D.O. (Feb. 8, 1985), amended by
D.O. (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Procurement Code]; Reglamento de la Ley de Adquisiciones,
Arrendamientos y Prestaci6n de Servicios Relacionados con Bienes Muebles [Regulations to the Law
for Acquisitions, Leases and Rendering of Services Related to Movable Goods], D.O. (Feb. 13,
1990), amended by D.O. (July 18, 1991); Reglas Generales para la Contrataci6n y Ejecuci6n de Obras
Publicas y de Servicios Relacionados con las Mismas para las Dependencias y Entidades de la
Administraci6n Pdblica Federal [General Rules for the Execution and Performance of Public Works
and Service Contracts Thereof Applicable to the Agencies and Entities of the Federal Public Administration], D.O. (Oct. 15, 1982). On May 27, 1993, the board of directors of Pemex made the following
resolutions: (i) the express authorization from the board of directors to the directors general of Pemex
and subsidiaries for the execution of service contracts, (ii) the execution of such service contracts will
only be allowed with respect to those cases where such services cannot be provided through Pemex
and its subsidiaries' own personnel and resources, and (iii) the officials shall refrain from surpassing
the relevant budget item.
48. See Public Works Law, supra note 47, art. 2; Procurement Code, supra note 47, art. 2.
Regarding public works contracts, in general, see JORGE CANALS, EL CONTRATO DE OBRA PUBLICA
(1991); see also JOAQUIN MARTINEZ, Los CONTRATOS DEavAOS DEL ARTICULO 134 CONSTITUCIONAL (1993).
49. Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 4; Pemex Charter, supra note 6, arts. 1-3.
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products must be solely by the 5corresponding
subsidiary, depending on
it controls; 0

the line of business
(iii) Pemex and its subsidiaries cannot assign, surrender, or transfer, or by
any means sell, compromise, or engage the so-called "assignments,"'
nor the rights and duties that stem from them, nor shall the assignments
be subject to attachment, levy, seizure, garnishment, or encumbrance of
52
any sort or nature;
(iv) the oil and natural gas cannot be sold, attached, garnished, seized, encumbered, or by any means compromised, engaged, or transferred, while it
53
remains unexploited and has not been extracted from the oil field;
(v) payments or compensation shall be made exclusively in cash for any of
the services rendered or works carried out by Pemex or its subsidiaries;
to stipulate, as remuneration, a percentage of the production or any participation in the results of such exploitations is therefore unlawful;4
(vi) Pemex and its subsidiaries are not allowed to concede, surrender, or grant
any type of royalties, percentages, or participation in the production of
domestic oil, natural gas, or any byproduct derived from them;55 and
(vii) any pipeline established or located throughout the Mexican territory must
be owned by Pemex.56
In light of the above public policy dispositions Pemex's sectoral head (the
Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Parastatal Industry) cannot assign operating rights
to any party other than Pemex, its subsidiaries, or any other decentralized public
agency specifically determined by a congressional decree. 57 Such operating rights
are nontransferable and cannot be compromised by any means. There are no
concessions or license agreements. In any service or work contract all the crude
oil and natural gas drilled and produced must belong to Pemex.
50. Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 3, § I; Enabling Petroleum Law, supra note 6, art. 3,
§.I;
Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 2.
51. "Assignments" are sovereign acts whereby the state, through the sectoral head of Pemex (the
Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Parastatal Industry), grants Pemex or any other decentralized public
entity appointed by Congress (such as the subsidiaries), the authorization for the drilling and production
of a determined oil field or well. The assignments are not within the stream of commerce so they are
not subject to alienation, attachment, or any form of encumbrance. Assignments are instruments
employed by the state to insure control over domestic hydrocarbons for the benefit of the nation. See
Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 5; Enabling Petroleum Law, supra note 6, art. 5.
52. Enabling Petroleum Law, supra note 6, art. 15.
53. Id. art. 19.
54. Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 6.
55. Id.
56. See Enabling Petroleum Law, supra note 6, art 31. Although this disposition might not be
directly relevant to the issue of service contracts, the reader should bear in mind its interrelated
implications for the transmission or transportation of fuels in Mexico. In connection with this matter
is the fact that Pemex has the exclusive right to import oil and gas into Mexico from abroad, namely,
from the United States. See North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA], annex
602.3(3). All references to NAFTA are to the December 17, 1992, draft.
57. See Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 4; Pemex Charter, supra note 6, arts. 1-3.
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Additionally, risk-service contracts, 58 production-sharing agreements, petroleum investment agreements, turn-key and standard drilling contracts, ad hoc
joint ventures, or any type of service or public work contracts are unavoidably
proscribed and unenforceable in the event that an interest, percentage, or a share
of the production is conveyed to the independent contractor as a means of payment
or compensation. 59 Likewise, Mexican law strictly forbids earn-in agreements
whereby the contributing party acquires an interest in a well upon the successful
completion of the drilling contract, or a royalty, or a net profit interest in production. The law also prohibits the granting of any form of leasehold interest or oil
and gas lease agreement. In sum, Pemex and its subsidiaries exclusively control
the drilling and production of a well,6° despite the fact that they are legally capable
of entering into service and work contracts. 6'
Thus, if an independent contractor drills a well, or if an independent supplier
furnishes a service contract, the law precludes such contractor from receiving as
compensation a daci6n en pago (payment with kind or royalty in kind), with a
participation or percentage of the hydrocarbon production. 62 Finally, Pemex and
its subsidiaries cannot transfer, assign, sell, surrender, use as a collateral, or
compromise by any means an unexploited product that lies in the subsoil.
Nonetheless, if Pemex or any of its subsidiaries comply with their legal obligation of being the firsthand seller, the purchaser may freely transfer title of the oil
and gas. Once tide passes from Pemex or any of its subsidiaries to the purchaser,
full and unrestricted power of alienation vests in the purchaser, 63 except, of
course, if the deal involves a title-retention type of sale, or probably even a
58. A risk-service contract is a contract "which places the burden of making original investments and taking risks on the company or 'contractor.' For successful efforts, the contractor is
entitled to recover capital expended and interest plus a payment called the 'risk fee.' " HOWARD
R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1079 (8th ed. 1991). A
"risk fee" does not necessarily have to be made in kind as participation in the production or a
drilling of a well.
59. Curiously, many argue that the risk contract prohibition comes from the direct interpretation of the Expropriation Act of 1938. But the risk contract limitation comes from the 1958
Petroleum Law. The Petroleum Laws of 1940 and 1941 expressly allowed this type of contract,
as provided in their articles 7 and 8 respectively. See Cuadro Comparativo entre las Leyes
Reglamentariasdel Articulo 27 Constitucional en Materia de Petrdleo Publicadas en el Diario
Oficial de: 9 de Noviembre de 1940, 18 de Junio de 1941 y 29 de Noviembre de 1958, PEMEX-LEx
L.J., July-Aug. 1992, at 43-45.
60. This is, of course, once an assignment has been issued in favor of Pemex or to one of its
subsidiaries, as provided by article 5 of the Petroleum Law and article 5 of the Enabling Petroleum

Law. See

LANZ,

supra note 32.

61. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 4.
62. What's more, for all of Pemex's reaching out to foreigners

See

for help, the Constitution and Mexican law prevent
it from offering the one reward that would draw heavy investment and technology from American oil companies.
The companies would come, they have made clear, if the payoff for their risk is a share of the oil they find and
produce.
Louis Uchitelle, Pemex: Mexico's Hesitant Oil Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at DI.

63. Even if title has been passed by Pemex and all of the incidents of ownership are vested in
the buyer, the latter cannot engage in refining the product domestically. See Enabling Petroleum Law,
supra note 6, arts. 23, 24.
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conditional sale or a purchase money security interest, as provided under Mexican
law.M
As the reader can tell, the Mexican Government overregulates Pemex. Negotiating a contract with Pemex is always a difficult experience because of the bulk
of regulations that govern and constrain the conduct of the parastatal. A cautious
deregulation process seems to be necessary to allow Pemex to pursue its modernization.
C. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS

One of the provisions of the NAFTA that prompted reaction from certain
sectors of Mexico was the inclusion of performance contracts. This stipulation
provides that signatories to the NAFTA must allow their state-run66companies to
enter into performance provisions within their service contracts.
Indubitably, through this disposition the NAFTA drafters sent a direct message
to Mexico, purposefully drafting it in broad terms. First of all a performance
contract is not a term of art under Mexican law, nor in the United States or in
Canada. Thus, such a vague term is subject to varying interpretations depending
on the governing law applicable to service contracts. One thing is certain at least
under Mexican law: paying a percentage of the hydrocarbon production or a share
of such output as compensation for a service contract performed by an independent
contractor is unlawful. 7 That does not mean that Mexican law bars Pemex or its
subsidiaries from granting incentives to their contractors when those contractors
successfully perform their obligations. The only thing clearly forbidden is that
Pemex and its subsidiaries make a payment in kind by taking a percentage of the
hydrocarbon production, or by granting as an incentive for the work performed
a participation in drilling even if the end payment is made in cash. 68 In other
64. See, e.g., compraventacon reservade dominio orpactocon cldusularescisoria.C6digo Civil
para el Distrito Federal en Materia Comdn y para toda la Reptiblica en Materia Federal [Federal Civil
Code] [C.C.D.F.] arts. 2312, 2310.
65. See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 602, annex 602.3(4).
66. "The use of performance clauses would bring Mexican contracting practices into closer
conformity with world standards and should make contracting with Pemex more attractive for foreign
companies." Thad Grundy, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of Energy, A Policy Overview of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Conference Before
the Planning Forum, Houston Chapter 12 (Feb. 17, 1993).
67. Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 6.
68. Even if this performance contract provision had been clearer as to allowing Pemex and its
subsidiaries to accord this type of "quasi-risk contract," this disposition would not have any legal
effect in Mexico. Under Mexican constitutional law a treaty cannot derogate Mexican federal law.
Thus, this NAFTA disposition cannot supersede or derogate the risk contract prohibition prescribed
under article 6 of the Petroleum Law. See the Mexican principle of the autoridadformalde la ley
in MEX. CO NST. art. 72(f) which reads: "[iun the interpretation, amendment, or repeal of laws or
decrees, the same procedure shall be followed as that established for their enactment." See also MEX.
CONST. art. 133. But see Fernando A. Vdzquez Pando, Jerarqufa Constitucional del Tratado de Libre
Comercio en el Sistema Constitucional Mexicano, Remarks Delivered at the Conference Panorama
Juridico del Tratado de Libre Comercio, Sponsored by the Universidad Iberoamericana Law School,
pt. I, at 35.
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words, Mexican law prohibits any provision that the contractor will be paid by
69
a monetary equivalent of a specified share or a percentage of production.
In light of the foregoing, and being cognizant of what the Constitution and the
Petroleum Law mandate, the reasons that motivated the adoption of such a provision remain unclear to the author. Mexico has no proscription on stipulating
performance incentives, so long as the independent contractors are excluded
from
70
receiving ownership rights or participating in profits from any output.
H. President Salinas's Modernization Program
Liquidity and financial troubles in Mexico during the 1980s led observers to
call it the lost decade. During the 1980s hard currency was channeled to pay down
Mexico's external debt obligation.l Pemex, as everyone concurs, played a crucial
role as a catalyst of foreign exchange, but at a price. As a result of paying down
debt, Mexico experienced a sharp decline in exploration and drilling production
for many years.72
Upon President Salinas's accession to office profound changes began in Mexico, including revitalizing Mexico's most valuable asset: the petroleum industry. 3
Instead of including Pemex within its extensive privatization program, Salinas
decided to modernize the entity and, accordingly, the oil industry.74 An aggressive
National Energy Modernization Program was issued in 1990 calling for the enhancement of Pemex's production levels in order to meet domestic demand and
to keep exports at 1.4 million barrels per day.
After the debt relief was accomplished, the Mexican government and Pemex
finally resumed previously interrupted investment programs. Pemex launched a
comprehensive restructuring survey in order to streamline operations. Pemex
embarked on a complete reorganization program, which is currently in effect, to

69. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
70. The purpose of this work is to make an analysis of the Mexican petroleum law from a legal
perspective. An economic and political analysis of the subject, or whether the risk-contract limitation
should be lifted, is deliberately omitted.
71. "The Mexican debt drama brought home, however, the reality that the global oil boom was
over, and the fact that 'oil power' was less powerful than assumed. Oil could mean not only wealth

but also weakness for a nation." YERGIN, supra note 18, at 732.
72. See ERNESTO MARCOs-GIACOMAN, INVESTMENT FINANCING AS A KEY TO RESTRUCTURING

THE MEXICAN OIL INDUSTRY 44 (1992).
73. See, e.g., Tim Golden, Mexico Pries Open Its Oil Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at
D 1;George W. Grayson, Mexico's Pemex Begins to Act Like a Competitor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
1991, at All.
74. Since the breakup of Standard Oil Trust in 1911, the real wealth and power in the [world] industry has tended
to come not from the downstream, refining and marketing, but from upstream, ownership and control of the oil
in the ground. And that means the state-owned companies of the oil exporters have the preeminent position today.
They are a diverse group-Saudi Aramco, Petrdleos de Venezuela, Pemex in Mexico, the Kuwait Petroleum
Company (atleast until 1990), Statoil in Norway, to name a few.

YERGIN, supra note 18, at 777.
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modernize operations.75 With Salinas's modernization program Pemex's dual role
as a political instrument and a commercial player began to evolve towards a
more integrated oil corporation. 76 Pemex finally began to behave more like an
international company rather than a political institution. 77 As a consequence,
Salinas's and Pemex's reforms have had a perceptible effect in international
business transactions in the energy sector.7"
Since Pemex resumed exploration and increased drilling operations, many

international contracts have been opened up for bids. 79 A considerable number
of procurement projects are currently being implemented, and meaningful turnkey
service contracts have been awarded to U.S. investors.S° Pemex also awards many
public works contracts based upon international public biddings. 8' Thus, Pemex's

75. "There has been a distinct move, spearheaded by the major Latin American countries (Chile,
Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil), towards restructuring state resource companies to make them
less politicized, more commercially focused and accountable and more like private companies, in
terms of business focus, autonomy and competitiveness." Thomas Walde, Recent Developments in

Negotiating InternationalPetroleum Contracts, PETROLEUM

ECONOMIST

3 (Int'l Energy L. Special

Supp., July 1992).
76. George Grayson, Mexican Revolution at Pemex, J. COM., July 7, 1992, at A8; Sanchez &
Bardacker, The PrivateMemoirsofPetrtleosMexicanos 1938-199?, EL FINANCIERO INT'L, Feb. 10,
1992, at 14-17.
77. Pemex not only acted more aggressively in the international arena, but also started to enter
into strategic alliances with other major international oil companies, actions never envisioned in the
past by many politicians. See, for example, the joint venture between Pemex and Shell Oil Company
for the purchase of 50 percent of the Deer Park refinery. But see, e.g., Josd Luis Manzo, El Convenio
con Shell, 1 Vuelta al Pasado?, ExciLSIOR, Mar. 12, 1993, at 2-1. Even before, however, Pemex
began to further internationalize the enterprise. On May 24, 1989, Pemex incorporated a Mexican
stock company called P.M.I. Comercio Internacional, S.A. de C.V., a/k/a, PMI. Since Pemex has
the controlling interest of this corporation-about 84 percent of shares, the rest of the stock distributed
between Nafin and Bancomext, State development banks-PMI is also regarded as a parastatal. See
discussion supra note 20. PMI is the head of another group of international ventures, such as Pemex
Internacional Espafia, S.A., PMI Holdings, N.V. (Antilles), PMI Holdings, B.V. (Holland), PMI
Services, B.V. (Holland), PMI Services North America, Inc. (Houston), PMI Holdings North
America, Inc. (Delaware), PMI Norteam~rica, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico, D.F.), PMI Services Europe,
Ltd. (London), PMI Trading, Ltd. (Ireland), and Repsol (Spain) (5 %). PMI along with the above-cited
group of international entities has been in charge of the international trade of Pemex's products. See
PETR6LEos MEXICANOS, MEMOIUA DE LABOIRs 68, 69 (1992) (Pemex's Annual Report).

78. See, e.g., Sheila Hollis, Mexican Energy Law Developments, PETROLEUM

EcONOMIST

26

(Int'l Energy L. Special Supp., July 1992); Alva Senzek, Plan to Revamp Mexico's Pemex May Draw
Outside Investment, J. CoM., June 8, 1992, at 6B, col. 1.
79. Sheila S. Hollis, North America Free Trade and Investment, Remarks Delivered at a Seminar
Sponsored by the Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association, New
York, N.Y., 3 (Apr. 10, 1992).
80. See, for example, the cases of Triton International Corporation and Smith International, Inc.
Id. Turnkey drilling contracts have helped Pemex to reduce delays and costs in upstream activities.

See

MARCos-GIACOMAN,

supra note 72, at 45.

81. The procurement of capital goods and technology transfer remain as key factors for the
modernization of Pemex and its subsidiaries. Being aware that state of the art technology means the
ability to stay in business in the oil industry, the federal Congress created, in 1965, the Instituto
Mexicano del Petr6leo (the Mexican Institute of Petroleum, or IMP). The IMP is also a decentralized
public entity. Pemex, the IMP, and the private sector of Mexico have been able to develop and
manufacture a significant technology for the oil industry. For that reason, Pemex, along with the IMP
and certain Mexican corporations, incorporated a private stock company called Mexpetrol, S.A. de
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modernization endeavors are expected to enhance business opportunities for Canadian and U.S. oil-producing and oil service contracting companies.8 2 As Pemex
and its subsidiaries' upstream activities increase, border sister states such as Texas
will undoubtedly greatly benefit. 83 As both Texas and Mexico share a border and
have an oil-based economy, the flow of manufactured goods and services will be
facilitated.84 Gas supplied to Mexico by Texas and other border states has been
steadily increasing, along with other basic and secondary petrochemicals, 85 even
though Mexico produces large amounts of natural gas. 8 Louisiana and California,
sharing a border with Texas and with Mexico, respectively, and having such a
strategic location, one on the Gulf of Mexico87 and the other on the Pacific Ocean,

will also benefit as a consequence of Pemex's investment program.
Likewise, the international procurement of service and works contracts has
been fueled by U.S. Eximbank loan guarantees and other financial deals. Because
of Mexico's restriction on foreign direct investment, risk-service contracts, and
the excessive and stringent tax regime placed on Pemex and its subsidiaries,
Pemex must secure capital through external debt obligations. In order to cope

with the modernization program Pemex has actively increased its sources of
funding, specifically with the help of U.S. capital markets.88
As of August 18, 1992, the list of basic petrochemicals was once again reclassified. Eight remained as basic petrochemicals and thirteen as secondary petrochemicals. The basic petrochemicals are: Ethane, Butane, Pentane, Hexane, Heptane,
C.V., with the purpose of selling and advising customers abroad in regard to the transfer of technology
in the petroleum industry. Pemex has 25 percent of the stock, the IMP 5 percent, and the rest of the
shares are allocated among other Mexican equipment and oil field service companies. Furthermore,
Pemex is also making strategic alliances in the environmental field, as with the company Servicios
Integrales de Protecci6n Ambiental, S.A., which was incorporated in conjunction with Grupo ICA,
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., and the IMP. See PETR6LEOS MEXICANOS, supranote 77, at 147.
82. See GAO/NSIAD-92-169 Mexican Oil, at 3; see also Hollis, supra note 79, at 26.
83. See GILBREATH RICH & DAVID HURLBUT, FREE TRADE WITH MEXICO: WHAT'S IN IT FOR
TEXAS? 6-7 (Policy Report No. 1, U.S.-Mex. Policy Studies Program, Lyndon B. Johnson School
of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin, 1992).
84. Id.
85. Even though Mexico's petrochemical sector is ranked first in Latin America with a huge
potential and economic growth, Mexico has been suffering a trade deficit in this sector. See ERNESTO
MARCos-GIACOMAN, THE MEXICAN OIL INDUSTRY: FINANCING INVESTMENT IN A NEW ECONOMIC
ENVIRONMENT 31 (1992).
86. "Mexico's position as a gas importer could reverse after the turn of the century." JUDITH
DWARK1N, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IN ENERGY 74 (1992). Lack of capital

expenditure, poor pipeline and distribution infrastructure, environmental concerns, geographic constraints, market conditions, and other priorities were some of the reasons that have been attributed
to the deficient development of the natural gas industry in Mexico, despite its enormous reserves. See
Sharon Rejer, The Pemex Paradox, FIN. WORLD MAG., July-Aug. 1990, at 50; Hollis, supra note
79, at 27.
87. Fifty-six percent of Mexico's proven oil reserves are established in the Gulf of Mexico. In
1991, approximately 71 percent of the crude oil obtained was produced in offshore facilities located
mainly in the Sound of Campeche. See PETR6LEOS MEXICANOS, MEMORIA DE LABORES (1991).
88. See Paul Hannon, Latin America's Sassy Borrower, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 12 (Special
Supp., June 1992).
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Propane, Raw Material for Carbon Black, and Naphthas. The secondary petrochemicals are: Xylenes, Tolulene, Propylene, Para-xiene, Ortho-oxylene, Methanol, N-paraffins, Benzene, Butadien, Acetylene, Ethylene, Ammonia, and Butyraldehyde. The law requires a permit from the Mexican Petrochemical Commission
in order to produce secondary petrochemicals. 89 Only up to 40 percent of outstanding shares may be acquired or controlled by foreign investors in a Mexican venture
that produces secondary petrochemicals. 90Nevertheless, by using a trust fund for
up to twenty years, such foreign investment limitations may be circumvented in
accordance with the recently promulgated investment regulations. 91 Under a law
pending before Congress all restrictions on foreign investments in the manufacture
of secondary petrochemicals will be removed. A reason for this pending law is
that under article 1102 of the investment chapter of the NAFTA, Mexico has
agreed to eliminate the current 40 percent limitation on foreign investment for all
nonbasic petrochemicals. NAFTA takes precedence because under Mexican law
a treaty cannot derogate federal law. 92 Recently, one of the subsidiaries (PemexPetroquitnica), along with the Ministry of Finance of Mexico, announced that it
would accelerate privatization of those parts of the petrochemical sector not
exclusively reserved to the state (secondary petrochemistry). 93 Through an international bidding process Pemex, Pemex-Petroqufmica, and the Ministry of Finance will sell sixty petrochemical plants. 94
A.

THE RESTRUCTURE OF PEMEX AND THE OIL INDUSTRY

Lately, Salinas has called for the acceleration of Pemex's modernization program; and Congress recently passed a presidential bill to amend the Pemex Charter. 95 With this reform initiative Pemex is being decentralized and restructured
into four distinct parastatals. Thus, as Pemex is restructured and reorganized, the
oil, gas, and basic petrochemical industry of Mexico also becomes restructured.
The four new decentralized public entities created by Congress are:
(1) Pemex-Exploraci6n y Producci6n (controlling the exploration, drilling,

89. See Resoluci6n que Clasifica los Productos Petroqufmicos que se Indican, dentro de la Petro-

qufmica Basica o Secundaria [Resolution that Classifies the Petrochemical Products Within Basic or

Secondary Petrochemistry], D.O. (Aug. 17, 1992); but see Barbosa Cano, Las Reclasificaciones
Energdticasson Ticnica y Econ6micamente Injustificables, Excg.LSIOR, Mar. 16, 1993, at 1-I.

90. See Foreign Investment Law, supra note 13, art. 5.
91. See Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n
Extranjera [Regulations to the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and for the Regulation on Foreign
Investment], D.O. (May 16, 1989) arts. 23-26 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Regulations]; see also
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Dilemma of HydrocarbonInvestment in Mexico's Accession to the North
America Free Trade Agreement, 9 J. ENERGY NAT. REsouRCEs ENVTL. L. 261, 269 (1991).

92. See the principle of the autoridad formal de la ley, MEX.

CONST.

art. 72(f).

93. Regarding the distinction of basic petrochemistry vis-A-vis secondary petrochemistry, see

discussion supra note 11.

94. Privatizaci6nPetroqufmica en Puerta, EL FINANCIERO, Feb. 2, 1993, at 1.

95. See discussion supra note 8.
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and production of oil and natural gas; its transport, storage in terminals,
and its marketing);
(2) Pemex-Refinaci6n (controlling refining; manufacturing of oil products and
oil derivatives that may be used as basic industrial raw materials; storage,
transport, distribution, and marketing of the products and derivatives);
(3) Pemex-Gas y Petroqufmica Bgsica (controlling the industrial processing of
natural gas, natural liquid gas, artificial gas, and basic petrochemistry;
storage, transport, distribution, and marketing of these products, as well
as the derivatives that may be used as basic industrial raw materials); and
(4) Pemex-Petroqufmica (controlling the secondary petrochemistry and industrial petrochemical processes whose products are not part of the basic
petrochemicals, as well as the storage, distribution, and marketing). 9
The main purpose of the legislation was to restructure Pemex in order to
modernize the oil industry. Congress based the bill upon two premises: to maintain
the Mexican Government's ownership and control over the domestic hydrocarbons, and to maintain Pemex's central management over each one of the areas
in which the industry's activities are to be restructured, ranging from exploration
to the marketing of products.97 In compliance with the Constitution and applicable
federal statutes,9" the state will retain ownership and control over Pemex and the
four newly created autonomous incorporations." The Petroleum Law will not be
modified, and its regulations will not suffer any change. The most significant
change is that the petroleum industry will no longer be entrusted to just one entity,
Pemex, but to four more organismos subsidiarioslegally and administratively
independent, but ultimately controlled by Pemex.

B.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEMEX AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES

Under the new law Pemex and its subsidiaries will jointly maintain the structure
of an integrated oil company.' tu Pemex and the subsidiaries will be responsible
for the development of Mexico's petroleum industry. Pemex will be in charge of
the strategic management, central planning, and general control of the subsidiaries
and, in that sense, of the petroleum industry.'°' Nonetheless, the subsidiaries will
96. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 3.
97. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, Explanation of Motives, at 12.
98. See the constitutional analysis of Ortega San Vicente, supra note 2, at 50-54. Notwithstanding
these considerable endeavors to modernize the oil industry, several reactionary voices remain. See,
e.g., the controversial legal analysis of the reforms expounded by Emilio Krieger, El Petr6leoDebe
Rescatarse del Entreguismo Globalizador, ExcgLSIOR, Mar. 12, 1993, at 3-1.
99. See Max CoN s. art. 25; Petroleum Law, supra note 2, art. 14; Parastatal Law, supra note
10, art. 14, § I; see also Organic Law, supra note 20, art. 45.
100. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, Explanation of Motives, at 17.
101. "Central administration should be understood as being the establishment of the system that
confers the industry's general strategic management upon Petr6leos Mexicanos and decentralizes
technical operations in organizations within a framework of unified collaboration and coordination."
Id. at 18.
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remain technically and legally independent juridical entities ready to implement
the corporate purposes assigned to them.
The four organismos subsidiariosare decentralized public entities similar to
Pemex. Under Mexican administrative law only decentralized public entities
could develop a strategic activity such as the petroleum industry.°2 Decentralized
03
public entities are created by an act of Congress or by an executive decree.'
Wisely, Salinas decided to incorporate the subsidiaries through Congress instead
of by an executive order.'°4
The Petroleum Law of 1958 expressly establishes that Pemex is exclusively
entrusted with the development of the petroleum industry along with other decentralized public entities that in the future may be created by law. 0 5 Thus, these
four new parastatals incorporated as decentralized public entities will have their
own separate legal existence and patrimony, fully empowered to carry on the line
of business assigned to them. However, these subsidiaries will still be under the
umbrella of Pemex.l10 It should be noted that the term "subsidiary" is an innovative term under Mexican administrative law'1 7 and also has other different legal
concepts attached to it.'0 5
102. See Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 14, § I. A prima facie contradiction exists with the
creation of Pemex-Petroqufmica. The contradiction is based on the fact that Pemex-Petroqufmica, as
a decentralized public entity, will be in charge of an economic activity that is not strategic; neither
will it provide a public service or social assistance as required under article 14 of the Parastatal Law.
Likewise, many of its activities will be gradually left to private parties, and many of its petrochemical
facilities will be privatized. Lately, the director general of Pemex, in a plausible effort to decentralize
Mexico City's profound bureaucratic concentration, announced that Pemex-Petroqufmica headquarters was being forthwith transferred to Coatzacoalcos, a city in the State of Veracruz. In the same
act, Francisco Rojas, the chief executive officer of Pemex, also announced that within a period of
one year, Pemex-Exploraci6n y Producci6n headquarters was going to move to one of the major cities
located southeast of Mexico City, possibly to Villahermosa, the capital of the State of Tabasco. See
Francisco Rojas, Speech at the 55th Anniversary of the Oil Expropriation (Mar. 18, 1993), reprinted
in INFORME 32 (1992). Wisely, one of the saving provisions embodied within the Pemex Charter,
article 4, established that the legal domicile of Pemex and its subsidiaries will be in Mexico City, the
Federal District, unless the executive branch provides otherwise. See also Pemex, S6lo de Mdxico:
Salinas, EL FINANCIERO, Mar. 19, 1993, at 1.
103. See Organic Law, supra note 20, art. 45.
104. President Salinas could have chosen to create the subsidiaries by an executive decree, in lieu
of passing the legislation, and avoid the two houses of the federal Congress. Nevertheless, due to the
importance that is always associated with the oil industry in Mexico, Salinas chose to proceed with
the debate and approval of the law by Congress. Notwithstanding that the ruling party controls both
houses, the passing and approval of the bill was supported by most of the opposition parties except
the most important left-wing party, the Partido de la Revoluci6n Democrgtica. See Pemex Charter,
supra note 6, Legislative History.
105. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 4, and Explanation of Motives, at 14.
106. See id. art. 3.
107. See Pedro Zorrilla, Remarks at the Conference La Nueva Ley Orggmica de Petr6leos Mexicanos y Organismos Subsidiarios, Organized by the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, at UNAM,
Mexico, D.F. (Jan. 19, 1993).
108. In terms of liability, the newly created entities could be construed to be subsidiaries of Pemex's
obligations, that is, that the subsidiaries will substitute, supply, or fortify Pemex's obligations. II
DicciONARIO DE LA REAL ACADEMIA EsPAROLA 1266 (1984). "One who or that which furnishes
supplemental aid or supplies; an auxiliary; assistant." NEW ILLUSTRATED WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
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The Pemex Charter establishes two types of joint and several obligations: one
retroactive, the other prospective. The first works by operation of law, the second
by agreement. The retroactive joint and several liability of the subsidiaries with
respect to Pemex's payment obligations is provided by operation of law within
the Pemex Charter. In order to avoid a material breach of any credit obligation,
or especially to avoid an international loan default, one of the saving provisions
of the Pemex Charter established that the new law "will not affect in any way the
national and international payment obligations of Petr6leos Mexicanos contracted

before this regulation came into effect. Therefore, the organismos subsidiarios
that this law established will be jointly and severally liable for the payment of
such obligations."'09 With this saving provision the Mexican Congress sent a
direct message to the international financial community. That message was that
Pemex was not trying to avoid its international financial obligations because it
was subject to a restructure decree or because of the fragmentation of Pemex's
assets and operations. Essentially, Pemex was worried about three major cove-

nants within its international loan agreements. First, a representation and warranty
that Pemex shall always remain the only entity in Mexico entitled to exploit and

develop the petroleum industry; second, a representation and warranty (or a
negative pledge) that the assets and properties of Pemex shall not be substantially
transferred to other entities; third, and closely linked with the other two, Pemex's
covenant to refrain from committing an event of default as stipulated in the
contract. This concern was more significant because of cross-default provisions
within some international credit agreements of Pemex and the Mexican federal
government. One may say that upon promulgation of the Pemex Charter, a technical loan default occurred. But this loan default, if any, no longer continues.

960 (1992). That would mean that in the event that Pemex fails to comply with its obligations, the
subsidiaries will substitute or supply Pemex. This approach is not only inappropriate, but misleading.
Pemex and each subsidiary has its own separate legal identity, and, above all, the Pemex Charter
establishes that these entities will have the nature of being subsidiaries with respect to Pemex, to the
extent provided within the Pemex Charter. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 3. Another confusing
interpretation is the corporate ownership approach because it might consider the term "subsidiary"
as a parent-subsidiary relationship, that is, that Pemex owns the subsidiaries. Pemex cannot be the
owner or a holding of another decentralized public entity; only the state can be the "owner" of an
organismo ptiblico descentralizado. Decentralized public entities do not have stock, equity, stated
capital, or any title of ownership. See MEX. CONST. art. 25, para. 4; Petroleum Law, supra note 2,
art. 4. It would be more accurate, however, if we utilize the concept of corporate control in order
to determine the subsidiary relationship of Pemex vis-A-vis the subsidiaries. See the definition of
"[u]nder another's control" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979). Under the new law
Pemex will carry out the central administration and overall control of the oil industry. The new law
vests Pemex with the exclusive power of being the central guidance of the oil industry. With this
power, Pemex has the undisputed control of the subsidiaries, despite the fact that they have their legal
autonomy and they do not have an "owner." Pemex has the central administration and overall control
of the oil industry, which is to be implemented through the board of directors and the director general
of Pemex. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, Explanation of Motives, at 18. See also generally
Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 17.
109. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 8, Transitory Provision.
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The same day that the Pemex Charter was published, the breach was juridically
remedied due to the transitory provision of article 8. This saving provision is
virtually a "guaranty" from Congress to Pemex's lenders that the subsidiaries
created by the legislative act are jointly and severally liable as a matter of law,
and all payment obligations contracted out by Pemex before the effectiveness of
the Pemex Charter will be honored. Now, instead of having only one debtor, the
creditors have four more from which to seek relief for its loan exposure entered
into before the issuance of the Pemex Charter. Furthermore, Pemex's reorganization did not entail a materially adverse change in its financial conditions. To the
contrary, the restructure of Pemex will foster its financial health. "o
The Pemex Charter expressly provides upon the agreement of the subsidiaries
for the prospective joint and several liability of the subsidiaries with regard to
Pemex's payment obligations. However, the law has always granted this right to
any person."' To reinforce this point, the Pemex Charter states that "Petr6leos
Mexicanos and the organismos subidiariosmay be severally or jointly and severally liable for any national or international payment obligations."' 2
Finally, by operation of the Pemex Charter, its subsidiaries are subrogated in
the rights and obligations of Pemex in accordance with the scope of activities
assigned to them." 3 Thus, upon the approval by Pemex's board of directors,
all assets, properties, activities, functions, and personnel originally under the
ownership, control, or management of Pemex should be transferred to the subsidiaries pursuant to their corporate purposes. '4 Once Pemex formally transfers these
assets, the subsidiaries will have constituted their own patrimony."'

C.

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PEMEX

The new law provides that the board of directors will be the highest decisionmaking body in the petroleum industry. The Pemex Charter gives this power in
spite of the authority legally granted to Pemex's sectoral head, the Ministry of

Mines, Energy, and Parastatal Industry (commonly known by its Spanish acronym
as SEMIP).

6

1

Under Mexican administrative law the ministry regulates the "oil

110. See generally L6pez-Velarde, supra note 44; Rogelio L6pez-Velarde, Loan Defaults by
Foreign Public Entities Caused by the Imposition of Currency Controls: The Case of Mexico (L.L.M.
Thesis, University of Houston Law Center, Spring 1990), translated into Spanish and published by
Pemex, INCUMPLIMIENTO A CONTRATOS DE CRPDITO INTERNACIONALES POR ENTIDADES PBLICAS

EXTRANJERAS CAUSADOS POR LA IMPOSiCI6N DE CONTROL DE CAMBIOS (1991).
111. See C.C.D.F. arts. 1988, 1989.
112. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 5.

113. Id. art. 7, Transitory Provision.
114. Saving provision article 6 of the Pemex Charter gives Pemex this tremendous task of fragmenting Pemex's properties and activities and transferring the corresponding assets and functions to the
subsidiaries. This task shall be effected in a term not to exceed one year from the date of effectiveness
of the Pemex Charter.
115. See also Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 5.
116. See Organic Law, supra note 20, art. 33, § VIII.
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industry, basic petrochemistry, mining, electricity, and the nuclear industry."" 7
Pemex and its subsidiaries are vested with a dual role: sole player in the petroleum

industry of Mexico and the industry's most important regulator." 8 This apparent
contradiction ofjurisdictions between an agency and a parastatal may be resolved
by the fact that by operation of law the chairman of the board of directors must
be the minister of the sectoral head of Pemex (SEMIP)." 9
Pemex's board of directors is composed of eleven members, 20
' of which six are
presidential appointees. Currently, all of the members are cabinet members except
one: the director general of the Comisi6n Federal de Electricidad (Federal Utilities

Commission, another major parastatal, known by its Spanish acronym as CFE).'2'
The cabinet members are the Ministers of Finance and Public Credit, Commerce
and Industrial Development, Foreign Affairs, Social Development (known by its
Spanish acronym as SEDESOL, one of its most important functions being to
122
protect the environment), and of course, the chairman of the board, SEMIP.
The Petroleum Workers Union appoints the remaining five members of Pemex's
23
board of directors.

The board of directors is powerful not only because it is integrated by highly
leveraged ministers, or because the Pemex Charter declares it the highest
decision-making body of the petroleum industry in Mexico, but also because of

the express power provided under article 10 of the Pemex Charter. Article 10
provides that all the necessary powers for the central administration and strategic

management of all activities covered by the petroleum industry are exclusively
reserved to the board of directors. This expressly includes: approving projects
in accordance with national energy plans, planning and budgeting of the state
117. Id. This apparent contradiction ought to be resolved through Mexican construction rules.
Both the Pemex Charter and the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration are federal
"secondary" legislations. As such, and in accordance with Mexico's supremacy clause, both legislations are on the same level. Accordingly, the former legislation should prevail in the event that we
follow the axiomatic rule of construction of lex posterior derogat priori or lex specialis derogat
generalis.
118. "Petr6leos Mexicanos shall be directed and managed by a Board of Directors which shall
be the highest management body of the oil industry .... Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 6.
119. Id. art 7; see also Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 18; Regulations to the Parastatal Law,
supra note 10, art. 16, § I. The appointment is strictly personal; no representation is allowed. The
director general is barred from being a member of the board. As to the requirements and impediments
in order to be eligible to the board, see Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 19, and Regulations to
the Parastatal Law, supra note 10, arts. 14, 15.
120. For each incumbent member, an alternate is appointed. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6,
art. 7.
121. The director general of Pemex is also a member of the board of directors of CFE. Currently,
Pemex is the only supplier of the requirements that CFE has for fuel oil, natural gas, and gasoil.
122. No requirement exists that the appointment of the board of directors of Pemex shall always
fall upon the head of one of the cabinet members, except for the Ministry of Finance and the chairman
of the board, who as already mentioned, must be the minister of the sectoral head of Pemex. See
Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 19; Regulations to the Parastatal Law, supra note 10, art. 17.
123. They must be active members of the union and permanent workers of Pemex. See Pemex
Charter, supra note 6, art. 7.
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petroleum industry globally, and evaluating strategic objectives thereof; 12 4 establishing policies and guidelines necessary to achieve a healthy economic and financial balance between the subsidiaries and affiliates, as well as permitting the proper
handling and management of the assets that the Mexican federal government
appropriates to the petroleum industry;' 5 and establishing or incorporating sub-

sidiary corporations or affiliates that may perform those economic or social activi126
ties that are not exclusively reserved to the state (that is, the strategic areas).
These express powers are meant to be illustrative and not exclusive.' 27 In any
event, the jurisdiction and authority of Pemex's board of directors and the directors of the subsidiaries will be28defined when the President promulgates the regulations of the Pemex Charter.'
Each of the subsidiaries has its own board of directors and a director general. 2 9
The boards of directors of the subsidiaries are integrated by eight members with
their corresponding alternates. 130 The chairman of each board is the director
general of Pemex. '31 Four of their members represent the federal government of
the United Mexican States and are appointed by the President. The other three

members are the directors general of the other three subsidiaries.
Coupled with Pemex's board of directors' faculties are powers granted to the
director general of Pemex, who is the chief executive officer of the entity. Among
the powers that the director general has as CEO of Pemex is global review of the
activities of the subsidiaries. Nonetheless, a surveillance office is set up in each
124. Id. art. 10, para. 1.
125. Id.
126. Id. art. 10, para. 2. Pemex is finally taking an approach closer to world standards by decentralizing operations through the creation of affiliates. Although, arguably, legally unnecessary because
such right has always been granted, the new Pemex Charter has expressly empowered Pemex to
incorporate entities in order to participate in those areas that are not exclusively reserved to the
state. Accordingly, Pemex is aggressively taking advantage of the situation in order to assist its
modernization objectives. For instance, in the near future, medical services, aviation services, telecommunications, and international procurement will be decentralized by means of stock companies
wholly owned by Pemex. See PETR6LEos MEXICANOS, supra note 77, at 123-29 (list of Pemex and
subsidiaries' affiliates); Sinchez and Bardacker, supra note 76, at 15.
127. Id. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 10.
128. The Pemex Charer did not repeal the regulations of the previous Pemex Charter enacted in
1971, Reglamento de la Ley OrgAnica de Petr6leos Mexicanos [Regulations to the Organic Law of
Petr6leos Mexicanos], D.O. (Aug. 10, 1972). Currently, and until the executive branch issues the
regulations applicable to the Pemex Charter, the 1972 regulations are effective inasmuch as they do
not oppose or contravene the Pemex Charter. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 3, Transitory
Provision.
129. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 8.
130. Id. art. 9.
131. Id. This might be a contradiction to article 18 of the Parastatal Law and article 16, section
I, of the Regulations to the Parastatal Law, which establish that the minister of the sectoral head of
the corresponding decentralized public entity shall be the chairman of the board (of course, in this
case we are talking about the same sectoral head: SEMIP). Perhaps we may find a response precisely
on the innovative administrative term of subsidiary; thus, if such entities are acting as subsidiaries
of Pemex, one may argue that the director general of the latter should be the chairman of the board
of the former.
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subsidiary. An official auditor (comisariopablico propietario), with its corresponding alternate (comisariosuplente), must be appointed by the Federal Comptroller's Office of Mexico (Secretarfa de la Contralorfa
General de la Federaci6n,
32
known by its spanish acronym as SECOGEF).

The President appoints the director general of Pemex. 33 He is the most important legal representative of Pemex and, hence, of the petroleum industry of
35
Mexico." The President also appoints the director general of each subsidiary,'
who acts as the legal representative of that subsidiary,' 36 and 3performs
other duties
7
as expressly delegated by the director general of Pemex.1
The director general of Pemex must resolve any discrepancy or conflict among
the entities with respect to their jurisdiction or scope of activity. 13' The Pemex

Charter will resolve many of the internal problems that now plague Pemex, its
subsidiaries, and other domestic and international affiliates.
In order to fully modernize the Petr6leos Mexicanos Group, one of the

greatest challenges of Pemex, its subsidiaries, and its affiliates is precisely the
internal adjustment that they must cope with as a consequence of Mexican legal
reforms and the reorganization process. The challenge facing Pemex is that it
must, by reorganization, restructuring, and paying greater attention to standard
business practices, become more competitive, more quality conscious, and
more efficient in the global petroleum industry. The proper allocation of activities and assets, and determining the boundaries of authority that the subsidiaries
and affiliates must observe between each other, will be something that will
require not only time, but also the proper political direction and coordination
of Pemex.

132. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 15.

133. Id. art. 6.
134. In such capacity, he has by operation of law all of the powers that correspond to attorneys-infact under Mexican law, whether for lawsuits and collections, for administrative acts, or for ownership
and disposition acts, as well as for those that require special provision in accordance with the first
three paragraphs of article 2554 of the Federal Civil Code, along with other special powers as enlisted
under article 12 of the Pemex Charter. These same powers are also conferred to the directors general
of the subsidiaries. They will act to the extent permitted by the scope of activities assigned to their
corresponding entities. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 6.
135. Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 8.
136. See the express powers conferred to the directors general of the subsidiaries in the Pemex
Charter, supra note 6, art. 11.
137. Id. art. 12, para. 2.
138. Id. art. 13, § IV. The director general of Pemex isalso exclusively empowered to: (i)prepare,
with the participation of the subsidiaries, the planning and strategic budgeting of the oil industry as
a whole and submit the same to the board of directors for its approval; (ii) prepare the financial
programs of the industry, define the basis for the systems of supervision, coordination, control, and
performance of the subsidiaries and affiliates for their joint operation, and the management of the
common services to them; (iii) pursuant to the terms of section A of article 123 of the Mexican
Constitution and of the Federal Labor Law, agree with the Petroleum Workers Union on the collective
bargaining agreement and issue the labor regulations of the officials, which shall govern the labor
relationships of Pemex and the subsidiaries. See Pemex Charter, supra note 6, art. 13.
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IV. The Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Industry Within the NAFIA
To this point the article has discussed the constitutional and federal regulations
regarding the ownership of natural resources in Mexico. The key principle is very
clear and simple: only the Mexican nation can own the hydrocarbons of Mexico's
subsoil, and only Pemex and its subsidiaries may exploit them. 139 But with the
completion of the NAFTA, Mexico's petroleum industry will change. Once the
Mexican Senate ratifies the NAFTA, and the ratification is published 4in the official
gazette,' 40 the NAFTA will become the supreme law of the land.' '
The core and main objective of the NAFTA is not only free trade, but also

direct investment. Many have argued that the monopoly of Mexico's petroleum
industry as a strategic activity, exclusively reserved to the state, is a restraint on
foreign investment. Moreover, the prohibition on granting contracts with a risk
fee in kind (oil and gas participation among other things already
described) is also
142

deemed to be a restraint on foreign direct investment.
In spite of these limitations, under the NAFTA, North America will become
one of the most important trading blocs of energy in the entire world. 143 This
commercial position will be jointly attained in spite of the fact that investment in

certain energy sectors such as oil, natural gas, and basic petrochemicals is excluded under the investment chapter of the NAFTA. At the inception of the
NAFTA negotiations all parties were fully aware that the Mexican Constitution
was not going to be on the table for negotiation. 1 " To the contrary, the Mexican
Constitution's supremacy clause clearly compels the NAFTA to be adjusted in
accordance
to the Mexican Constitution, not the Constitution adapted to the
145
NAFTA.

139. See Murphy, supra note 91, at 266.
140. See Ley sobre la Celebraci6n de Tratados [Law on Treaties], D.O. (Jan. 2, 1992) art. 4.
141. MEX. CONST. art. 133.
142. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 91, at 262-72.
143. In effect North America will have one of the largest trading blocks in the natural resources
sector by having the United States as the second largest oil producer of the world, Mexico as the fifth,
and Canada as the thirteenth. Pemex is the fourth largest enterprise in the world oil industry, after
Shell, Exxon, and British Petroleum. Pemex is the third largest company in the world, in terms of
its equity base, only after Shell and IBM. It is the sixteenth largest corporation in the world in terms
of its assets, and the fifth largest in the oil business, after Shell, Exxon, British Petroleum, and ENI.
See Sara Hammes & Richard Teitelbaum, How They Performed in 1990, FORTUNE, July 29, 1991,
at 238. Pemex as a corporation currently ranks number three in the world in crude oil and condensates
production. See Oil ProductionTriggered by Crisis Stays on Steam Throughout '91, OIL & GAS J.,
Dec. 30, 1991, at 43. Pemex is also the third largest as measured by the composite index (a combination
of reserves, output, refining capacity, and product sales by volume). See PETROLEUM INTELUGENCE
WKLY., Dec. 23, 1991. It should be remembered that Mexico is not a member of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
144. See, e.g., Stan McLelland, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Valero Energy
Corporation, Business Implications and Legal Rules for the World's Largest Common Market, Remarks at Conference Sponsored by the American Institute 4.
145. See MEx. CONST. arts. 133, 15; see also V~zquez Pando, supra note 68, at 35.
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A. DISPARITIES AND SIMILARITIES OF THE THREE INDUSTRIES

All parties to the NAFTA were aware of the disparities in the structure and
function of the oil and gas industry in each country.'4 As such, opening the oil
and gas industry in Mexico was never a condition for the economic integration
of North America. The dissimilarities in the petroleum industry in the United
States, Mexico, and Canada were always known. 4 7 The rationale to integrate in
the energy sector was to accomplish a complementary adjustment of the three
industries in order to form a unified and powerful trading block.
In the United States, for instance, private ownership prevails in the production,
development, and distribution of oil and gas. The United States does not have a
state-run oil company. The whole spectrum of the energy sector of the United8
States, however, is a combination of public, quasi-public, and private activity. 14
The federal and some state governments have conserved limited ownership of

natural resources of some lands. Few public utilities companies exist because
the oil and gas industry is largely controlled by privately owned companies.

Furthermore, the U.S. petroleum sector has a diversified market compounded by
a competitive and decentralized industry. 4 9
Canada, on the other hand, significantly follows the same pattern of a mixed
economy as Mexico, although Mexico has a more pronounced state intervention
in the energy sector. While the Canadian Government virtually leaves the produc-

tion and marketing of energy products to private players, meaningful participation
lies with federal and provincial governments as to holding interests in some
business ventures in the oil and gas industry. '" For instance, Canadians have the
so-called crown corporations at the federal and provincial level. ,5' Nevertheless,
the Mulroney administration initiated sweeping reforms and moved towards

146. See, e.g., Thad Grundy, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S.
Dept of Energy, Remarks at the University of Texas School of Law Seminar, Planning for North
American Free Trade, Mexico City (July 9 & 10, 1992).
147. An understanding of this topic, however, requires much more than ananalysis of economic data such asproduction
andprice. The political and cultural significance of oil in Mexico is not understood by most Americans, but has

afundamental bearing on the way Mexico approaches energy issues,
andin particular foreign participation in the
energy sector.

Id.
148. Donald Zillman & William Fox, Monopoly and Competition in Energy Supply: The Case of
the United States, J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L., Dec. 1979, at 78.
149. "The preference for private enterprise in energy is . . . a matter of Congressional choice
rather than Constitutional mandate." Id.
150. See C.D. Hunt & A.R. Lucas, Monopoly and Competition in Energy Supply: The Case of
Canada, J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L., Dec. 1979, at 96.
151. Petro-Canada is the best-known at the federal level. Petro-Canada was incorporated in 1975
as a reaction to Canada's reliance on foreign energy and the growth of foreign participation in the
oil industry. Although it was not privatized by the former conservative government, Petro-Canada's
activities have been limited or abolished. Many other crown companies at the provincial level have
been privatized. Id. at 117-18.
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privatizing governmental energy enterprises, deregulating oil pricing and marketing, and opening Canada to more foreign investment.152

B.

THE OIL, GAS, AND PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY WITHIN THE

NAFTA

Despite the major role that the energy sector played in the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), the same has not been the case for the NAFTA. The
NAFTA negotiations have primarily focused on free trade in the natural resources
sector, not with regards to the free flow of investment in that energy sector.
Chapter IX of the U.S.-Canada FTA shields Canada from embargos and import
duties and protects the United States from export prices and other export restrictions. ' Within the investment rules the parties agreed to give other nationals
no less favorable treatment than domestic investors. This method has not been
envisioned for the NAFTA. Hence, the exclusion of the oil, gas, and basic petrochemical industry within the NAFTA rules of investment was not critical for the
success of the trilateral talks. 54
In chapter XI, the investment chapter of the NAFTA, article 1108, exhibit III,
the parties agreed, upon Mexico's reservation, to exclude the oil, gas, and basic
petrochemical industry, including as expected all the activities comprised within the
petroleum industry. With respect to energy and basic petrochemicals, chapter VI of
the NAFTA, the parties deferred to each member state's constitution, thereby agreeing to Mexico's reservation and exclusion of the Mexican petroleum industry. 155
As in the FTA, little immediate effect on trade in the energy sector of North
America is expected. Canada, the United States, and Mexico have been trading in
a competitive environment for years,' 6 and already have taken measures to overcome
barriers to trade in energy commodities. Similarly to the FTA, the NAFrA promises
long-term stability in trade and ensures an adequate supply of energy products among
the three nations.' 57 However, Mexico did not accept the "proportional access"
clause (energy security and supply provision), as provided in the FTA.'58
152. See J. Owen Saunders, The Mexico Factor in North America Free Trade: A Canadian
Perspective, 9 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 239, 244-45 (1991); see also Donald
Macdonald, North American Free Trade Agreement: Critical Business and Legal Implications,

Remarks at the American Conference Institute Conference, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 2 & 3, 1992).
153. Import prices, however, can be used for the enforcement of antidumping and countervailing
duties. See Murphy, supra note 91, at 267-68.
154. See Saunders, supra note 152, at 266.
155. See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 601(3), annex 602.3(l)(a)(b).
156. See DWARKIN, supra note 86, at 71-72.
157. In accordance with article 603, annex 608.2(1)(2) of the NAFTA, Canada and the United
States agreed to observe exhibits 902.5 and 905.2 of the FTA and the Agreement on an International
Energy Program.
158. See Colleen Morton & Joseph Greenwald, A Preliminary Analysis of the North America Free

Trade Agreement, Remarks at the U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee 13 (Aug.
21, 1992). The reader should bear in mind that Canada had already committed itself to a similar
obligation as provided under the proportional access clause of the FTA, when it signed the International
Energy Agreement. See DWARXIN, supra note 86, at 77.
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GATT provisions were reasserted within the proposed energy and basic petrochemicals chapter of the NAFTA. 5 9 Accordingly, quantitive restraints, minimum or

maximum export-price requirements, and except as permitted for the enforcement
of countervailing duties and antidumping measures, minimum or maximum import-

price requirements are prohibited.' 60If a restriction on imports is to be imposed by

one of the parties, the parties shall consult and try to avoid undue interference in
price, marketing, and distribution. Dual pricing for internal and external consumers
will be gradually eliminated.' 61 As already covered by article XVII of the GATT,
Pemex and its subsidiaries, as state enterprises, are called to transact and behave under
commercial considerations.' 62Moreover, the procurement chapter of the NAFTA has
been seen as a promising sign especially for the
U.S. equipment and oil field service
63
companies that have suffered domestically. 1
159. "The most positive impact of the energy chapter is probably the fact that Mexico has now
for the first time in many years opened the door to limited foreign investment. This development,
coupled with the restructuring of Pemex and the need for foreign capital and technology, should mean
greater opportunities in the future for U.S. participation in Mexico's energy sector." Grundy, supra
note 66, at 10; see also Alejandro Alvarez B6jar, El TLC, Estratdgicoen la Privatizaci6ndel Sector
Energ~tico Mexicano, EL FINANCIERO, Jan. 18, 1993, at 35a. But see Rebeca De Gortari, En
Entredicho, el Futuro de la Industria Petr6lera, ExctLSIOR, Mar. 12, 1993, at 1-I.
160. See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 603(2).
161. Id. arts. 301, 606(a).
162. See id. ch. XV, Competition Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises. Overlooked by
sociologists, politicians, and lawyers are the consequences of the undertaking already assumed by the
Mexican Government since its accession to the GATT and the adoption of chapter XV of the NAFTA.
In Mexico the theme of empresa ptiblica, state enterprise, is a highly debated concept and a subject
that remains open to discussion by sociologists and politicians. For many scholars and government
policymakers, even those working in the ruling party, the main purpose of a state enterprise is not
necessarily to be a profit center ruled by commercial considerations. Regardless of the personal
opinion of the author, with the assumption of the above compromises, future administrations are
virtually constrained and are bound to observe the underlying principle of the NAFTA: a free market.
The coming generations shall be very cautious in implementing their policies and shall refrain from
breaching or departing from the principles embodied in such provisions. Interesting, however, is the
state enterprise definition adopted by the parties, which only considered the concept of control and
ownership of shares of the state company. NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 1505. As mentioned before,
under Mexican law there are other types of state enterprises that do not contemplate the concept of
control or ownership of stock. Pursuant to Mexican administrative law, ownership and control of the
outstanding shares of a corporation is one of several ways that the law finds to determine that a
company is a public instrumentality (parastatal). There are other entities that are parastatals (state
enterprises) that do not have shares. They include trust funds and decentralized public entities such
as Pemex and its subsidiaries and the Comisi6n Federal de Electricidad. Decentralized public entities
do not have stock, equity, stated capital, or any other type of title of ownership. These parastatals
are created by an act of Congress or by an executive decree. See Organic Law, supra note 20, art.
45; see also supra text accompanying note 20.
163. See McLelland, supra note 144, at 8. Mexico is not a party to the Agreement on Government
Procurement entered into force after the Tokyo Round (GATT procurement chapter). Nevertheless,
with the procurement chapter of the NAFTA, domestic procurement preferences will be abolished
in a term not to exceed ten years, including, of course, the acquisitions of Pemex and the CFE, the
two major parastatals in the energy sector of Mexico. For further review, see Grundy, supra note
66, at 8-13; Barshefsky & Lichtenbaum, Government Procurement Provisions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, Remarks delivered at the American Bar Association's Conference, The
North American Free Trade Agreement: Its Scope and Implications for North America's Lawyers,
Businesses and Policymakers, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 27 & 28, 1993).
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By making a global analysis of the NAFTA's chapters on investment, energy
and basic petrochemicals, procurement and competition policy, and monopolies
and state enterprises, substantial changes have been made to Mexico's oil, natural
gas, and petrochemical industry. These changes will be realized without affecting
the Mexican constitutional and juridical requirements concerning the petroleum
industry. With the conclusion of the NAFTA and Mexico's internal reforms,
Pemex will be in a better position to modernize its operations.
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